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protection  of  transaction  privacy.  We  discuss  these  arguments  by  relating  them  to  their
philosophical  roots  in  libertarian  and  neoliberal  theories,  and  assess  whether  Bitcoin  can
effectively meet these expectations. We conclude that despite its advocates’ enthusiasm, there
are good reasons to doubt that Bitcoin can fulfill its promises and act as a functioning currency,
rather than as a mere speculative asset.
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INTRODUCTION
While alternative currencies have always circulated along the main official currencies (Blanc,
2000), a new wave of currencies has emerged, bringing about important changes to the way that
we  conceive  money.  Relying  on  cryptography  and  peer-to-peer  networks,  these
“cryptocurrencies” neither rest on a central authority nor require any centralised management
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or system of payment. In the wake of criticisms of the contemporary banking system following
the  2007 financial  crisis,  they  have  gained  in  popularity,  and  have  been  presented  as  an
alternative to the current payment system.
Having  inspired  a  great  number  of  alternative  cryptocurrencies  such  as  Ripple,  Dogecoin,
Ethereum, etc 1, Bitcoin remains the most prominent cryptocurrency in terms of valuation and
public recognition 2. Bitcoin has been the subject of much enthusiasm, billed by some as “the
future of money” (Frisby, 2014), or presented as “challenging the global economic order” (Vigna
and Casey,  2016).  Its  proponents are often highly critical  of  state regulations over money,
sometimes conceived as inadmissible infringements on freedom, or as inefficient, unsecure, and
inflationary (Nakamoto, 2008, 2009).
Naturally, Bitcoin has also attracted a fair amount of skepticism, some going as far as denying
that Bitcoin really constitutes a form of money (Dodd, 2017; Glaser et al., 2014; Yermack, 2013),
or  noting that  the Bitcoin valuation exhibits  all  the characteristics  of  a  speculative bubble
(Dwyer,  2015).  Moreover,  a  substantial  amount  of  commentary  on  Bitcoin  focuses  on  its
technical functioning, or on discussing the achievements and flaws of its underlying technology
(see for instance Böhme et al., 2015).
Our aim in this article is different. We will avoid dwelling too long on how the technology behind
Bitcoin works, nor enter into the discussion as to whether Bitcoin is indeed a form of money. We
want to take Bitcoin’s proponents at their word: if we consider Bitcoin as a form of money, is it
appropriate for use as a currency? Moreover, Bitcoin is often hailed for its supposed advantages
over official currencies, the conventional payment system, such as being more stable, safe and
efficient, or in allowing to dispense with the need of a central authority. But can it effectively
meet these expectations? And if not, is there more to Bitcoin than a speculative bubble? This is
what we are going to discuss in this article.
After  a  brief  introduction  to  Bitcoin  for  those  not  already  familiar  with  its  technical
underpinnings (1), this article reviews four separate arguments in favour of its adoption (2):
namely that Bitcoin can be a more stable currency, achieve a more secure and efficient payment
system, provide a credible alternative to the central management of money, or better protect
transaction privacy. We discuss the philosophical background of these arguments by showing
how they relate to the principles of justice developed by libertarians such as Nozick (1974) and
Rothbard (2016), and neoliberal economists such as Hayek (1990 [1976]) and Friedman (1959,
1969). The third section of the article then assesses whether Bitcoin can effectively fulfil these
expectations (3). First, we will consider whether Bitcoin’s design makes it a stable currency;
(3.1). Second, we question the security and efficiency of Bitcoin’s payment system; (3.2). Third,
we  discuss  the  issue  of  whether  Bitcoin  can  indeed  function  as  a  radically  decentralised
currency, free from centralised governance or authority (3.3). Finally, we address the extent to
which Bitcoin can protect payment privacy (3.4). We conclude that it is unlikely that Bitcoin can
function as a currency unless it changes drastically, which would probably detract from the
characteristics that make it attractive to its proponents.
1. WHAT IS BITCOIN?
Whether Bitcoin is,  or is not, a form of money is still  a highly debated issue (Bjerg, 2016;
Urquhart, 2016; Glaser et al., 2014; Yermack, 2013). Of course, the definition of money is itself a
controversial issue. Money is sometimes conceived as a debt token (Graeber, 2011), as a social
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relation (Ingham, 2004), as a social totality (Aglietta and Orléan, 2002), or as a peculiar social
convention fulfilling  a  certain  number  of  functions  (Tobin,  2008),  among other  examples.
Despite their divergences, most theories of money generally recognise that, in modern societies,
money is a medium of exchange that is widely accepted within a specific community. 3 This
definition will suffice for the purpose of this article. In this article, we will assume that Bitcoin
can indeed be considered as a form of money, as our goal is to determine whether, as a currency,
it can fulfil certain specific aims or functions.
Bitcoin differs in many respects from “official currencies” such as the Euro or the Dollar. Coins
and notes are usually emitted by the Central Bank of each monetary zone (the European Central
Bank for the Eurozone, the US Federal Reserve for the Dollar), while deposit money, which
constitutes the vast majority of money supply today, is made up of funds held in demand deposit
accounts in commercial banks (McLeay, Radia, and Thomas, 2014).
By contrast, Bitcoin is a decentralised cryptocurrency that rests on a distributed repository,
protected and managed through the use of cryptographic protocols. It is thus independent from
any central authority.
First, Bitcoin is not backed by a State or a Central Bank. Contrary to the Euro or the Dollar,
where a Central Bank is in charge of ensuring price stability and financial stability through
adequate monetary policy (Goodhart, 2011; Goodhart et al.,  2014), there is no such central
authority in the Bitcoin system. There is no lender of last resort either, that is, a State or a
Central Bank that could bail out banks in the event of a financial panic (Goodhart, 1991; Blinder,
2010).
Second,  Bitcoin’s  payment  system  is  entirely  decentralised  and  rests  on  an  open-source
cryptographic protocol. This protocol originates from an article published in 2008 by a certain
Satoshi  Nakamoto  (2008),  whose  identity  remains  mysterious  (Davis,  2011).  The  central
innovation of Bitcoin, which puts together previous advances in cryptography, such as the proof
of work technology (Narayanan and Clark, 2017), is that it is based on a decentralised public
ledger (Ali et al., 2014a). In a conventional payment system, banks hold a record of transactions
and ensure that no unit of money is used more than once by the same user (“double-spending”
problem). With Bitcoin, this control system is decentralised through a public ledger system
operated on a peer-to-peer network. This ledger has several important properties. First, every
user can verify and process transactions. Moreover,  the Bitcoin protocol secures the ledger
against  falsifications,  without resorting to any banking institution or any central  authority.
Finally, an important consequence of the public availability of this ledger is that Bitcoin can only
preserve a “pseudo-anonymity” for its users: details of all transactions are logged on the public
ledger, where the only indication of the identity of their parties is their Bitcoin address (Luu and
Imwinkelried, 2015).
A  third  crucial  difference  between Bitcoin  and conventional  currencies  lies  in  its  creation
process. Every user can participate in the creation of new Bitcoins, by resolving a deliberately
complicated series of algorithms (though in practice this “mining” process is mainly taken up by
professional miners). The first Bitcoins were created from scratch and used by the first Bitcoin
users.  The first  user of  the protocol,  assumed to be Nakamoto himself,  mined the first  50
Bitcoins in 2009 (Wallace, 2011). The following Bitcoins are created when new transactions take
place, as a reward going to those who successfully add a new block to the ledger. More precisely,
miners, by solving puzzles, try to verify each transaction and to get the right to add it to a new
“block”  containing  several  transactions,  appended  in  the  Bitcoin  ledger  (also  called  the
“Blockchain”, for that reason). This new block is accepted within the ledger if it contains a valid
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transaction and a new puzzle solution. Miners are all competing to verify each transaction in
order to get the reward attached to the completion of a block. Along with this reward, miners
may also set a fee for processing transactions, as a complementary revenue. While at the start
these fees were marginal, they have tended to rise steeply recently due to network congestion,
which led to a major crisis about reforming the protocol (see section 3.1). Eventually, every time
a block is verified, new Bitcoins are minted. 4
However, this Bitcoin creation process has an algorithmic limit. The Bitcoin protocol has a
marginally decreasing rate of Bitcoin creation per block, which approximates the rate at which
gold is mined. Therefore, the total supply of Bitcoins will asymptotically approach the amount of
21 million (Houy, 2014), which, according to some estimations, will be reached around the year
2140 (Ali et al., 2014a). The reward of miners is therefore set to decrease, being divided by two
every 210,000 blocks, while the difficulty of mining is programmed to increase along with the
network  size.  Nowadays,  more  than  17  million  Bitcoins  have  been  mined  (according  to
blockchain.info, consulted 19/07/2018). Approximately 200,000 transactions take place every
day, for an estimated value of less than 1 million BTC.
2. THE CASE FOR BITCOIN ADOPTION
Bitcoin’s proponents do not form a homogeneous group, and many people may support Bitcoin
adoption for different reasons. However, the main recurring cases for Bitcoin adoption may be
summarised as follows:
Bitcoin can constitute a more stable currency than conventional state-sponsored money, by●
taking monetary policy out of the government’s hands
Bitcoin can provide a more secure and efficient payment system compared to a system relying●
on trusted third parties
Bitcoin can dispense with the need of coercive institutions such as States and Central Banks,●
by achieving a decentralised securing of transactions through cryptographic proof
Bitcoin helps protect users’ privacy against abuse of state power through government●
surveillance
First, Bitcoin is often hailed as a means to achieve a more stable monetary system (Ametrano,
2016; Collard, 2017; Lakomski-Laguerre and Desmedt, 2015; Rochard, 2013). As Nakamoto
(2009) stresses, with conventional currencies, “the central bank must be trusted not to debase
the currency, but the history of fiat currencies is full of breaches of that trust”. As others have
noted (ECB, 2012, p. 23), this criticism reminds the neoliberal critique that state monopoly in
the  issuance  of  money will  necessarily  lead to  over-inflation,  resulting  in  depressions  and
unemployment (Hayek, 1990 [1976]; Friedman, 1959, 1969). Hayek argued that governments
have a tendency to abuse their monopoly power by systematically creating too much money
(Hayek,  1990  [1976],  pp.  28–32).  Similarly,  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963)  argue  that
historically,  interventions  of  the  Federal  Reserve  of  the  United  States  have  been  mostly
detrimental to economic stability and have often worsened crises rather than solved them. Even
if this account has been contested (Kindleberger, 1973, 1978), Friedman argues on this basis that
monetary policy should “avoid sharp swings” (Friedman, 1968, 15) and proposed to “freeze” the
monetary  base  by  setting  a  fixed  rate  of  growth  in  the  amount  of  money  (around  3–5%
according to Friedman (1959, p. 91, 1968, p. 16)). His argument is based on historical evidence,
but also on his own theory, which, similarly to Hayek’s ([1976] 1990), predicts that excessive
money creation is inflationary and cannot impact employment in the long run (Friedman, 1968).
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The Bitcoin protocol is designed in this spirit and has been praised for its “perfect monetary
policy” (Rochard, 2013): since no central agencies can control the Bitcoin’s supply, whose rate of
growth is set algorithmically, it is immune from inflation. Actually, unless a majority of nodes
decides collectively to modify the protocol itself, there is no procedure for altering the rate of
Bitcoin creation. It is not our purpose in this article to discuss the economic merits of such a
fixed or “algorithmic” monetary policy, an issue which is the subject of an extensive literature
(see Bordo, 2008, for a review of the recent debates). However, as we shall see in section 3, to
really  fulfill  that  promise,  Bitcoin  must  be  able  to  dispense  with  any  central  governance
altogether and it is doubtful that it could, while retaining the other qualities that would make it
an attractive currency.
Second, Bitcoin is often presented as the basis for a more secure and efficient payment system,
which allows to dispense altogether with the need for a trusted third party (Ali et al., 2014a;
Angel and McCabe, 2015; Grinberg, 2011; Vidan and Lehdonvirta, 2018). According to Angel
and McCabe (2015, p. 606), Bitcoin “represents a technological solution that creates appropriate
incentives for honesty without needing a government to enforce laws against dishonesty.” This
motivation originally comes from a distrust of banking institutions, which, in the context of the
2008 global financial crisis, many consider as unsafe (Ali et al., 2014a, p. 6; Maurer et al., 2013,
pp. 261–262). Presenting Bitcoin in the aftermath of the crisis, Nakamoto (2009) has some
harsh words for our current banking system, where “Banks must be trusted to hold our money
and transfer it  electronically,  but they lend it  out in waves of credit bubbles with barely a
fraction in reserve”. Bitcoin’s payment system is presented as safer, since it does not require
trusting any particular payment intermediary. Moreover, Nakamoto also points to two other
disadvantages of having to rely on a trusted third-party: the transaction costs it induces, as well
as the possibility of fraud through reversal of transactions (see also Angel and McCabe, 2015, p.
606). By providing “a system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust”, Bitcoin purports to
reduce transaction costs due to the absence of intermediary, and reduce opportunities for fraud
by making transaction irreversible (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 1).
A third argument contends that Bitcoin may contribute to lessening the level of state coercion
facing  individuals,  by  putting  money  out  of  the  control  of  government  or  any  centralised
institution. Indeed, another common objection to the exercise of monetary policy by states,
besides stability, stems out of a libertarian concern for the protection of the rights and liberties
of individuals (Nozick, 1974; Rothbard, 2016). Safeguarding these rights and liberties puts limits
on what others can legitimately do to people without their consent. The State should keep only a
marginal role, which basically consists of protecting property rights from theft or fraud. Apart
from that, state interventions in the economy encroach on individual freedom (i.e., coercion),
and is therefore wrong. This argument clearly rejects the possibility of the State’s monopoly over
money.  In  the  words  of  Murray  Rothbard,  such  a  monopoly  allows  the  State  to  act  as  a
“legalized, monopoly counterfeiter” and use monetary creation as “a giant scheme of hidden
taxation”, therefore violating individual property rights (Rothbard, 2016). Similarly, for Hayek,
“legal  tender  is  simply  a  legal  device  to  force  people  to  accept  in  fulfilment  of  a  contract
something they never intended” (Hayek, 1990 [1976], pp. 39–40). It thus violates their freedom
to set voluntarily the terms of a contract.
Libertarianism  constitutes  an  important  philosophical  root  among  Bitcoin  proponents
(Golumbia, 2016; Karlstrom, 2014; Lakomski-Laguerre and Desmedt, 2015; Wallace, 2011). For
libertarians, such as Dowd (2014, p. 64), Bitcoin safeguards “the freedom of the individual to
trade, and the freedom of the individual to accumulate, move and protect his or her financial
wealth — in other words, financial freedom.” Because it supposedly allows to dispense with the
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need  for  any  central  institution,  Bitcoin  may  significantly  weaken  the  hold  of  coercive
institutions over individuals’ lives.
Bitcoin’s  fourth alleged advantage flows from the previous one:  because Bitcoin’s  payment
system (supposedly) does not rely on trusted intermediaries, it would better protect the privacy
of its users than conventional means of payments. For instance, Nakamoto (2009) complains
that “we have to trust [banks and payment intermediaries] for our privacy [and] trust them not
to let identity thieves drain our accounts”. In the aftermath of the NSA surveillance scandals
(Hintz, 2014), which has showed that private intermediaries could rarely be trusted to protect
the privacy of their customers against overreaching state authorities, privacy has often been
viewed as one of Bitcoin’s main appeal.
However, the extent to which Bitcoin can fulfil these promises is doubtful, as we will discuss in
the following section. Indeed, while Bitcoin’s distributed cryptographic proof is an important
technical achievement with interesting potential applications, basic market analysis makes it
dubious that Bitcoin’s promise to act as a reliable non-inflationary currency is really sustainable
(section 3.1). Moreover, there are reasons to be wary of its claim to provide a more secure and
efficient  means of  payment,  due to  the  prevalence of  intermediaries  and transaction costs
(section 3.2). Besides, Bitcoin’s decentralised architecture, while making it independent from
central  governance  from Banks  or  States  is  also  what  makes  it  extremely  difficult  for  its
community of developers and users to govern it (section 3.3). Finally, it is highly unlikely that
Bitcoin can meet the expectations of users who regard it as a way to better protect the privacy of
their transactions, and even if it did, it would raise serious concerns for the possibility of law
enforcement and redistribution (section 3.4).
3. CAN BITCOIN FULFIL ITS PROMISES?
3.1. IS BITCOIN A STABLE CURRENCY?
One of Bitcoin’s main promises is to provide a more stable currency than conventional, State-
backed money, that would not be plagued by the States’ or Central Banks’ inflationary biases, or
otherwise nefarious monetary decision.
However, even if Bitcoins were more widespread in the population, day-to-day use of Bitcoin as
a currency would still  face important hurdles,  due to its  high volatility  compared to other
currencies. Indeed, this volatility undermines its quality both as a means of exchange and as a
store of value.
Bitcoin’s volatility is well illustrated by the following graphs (Figures 1, 2, and 3), which show
that Bitcoin’s price has gone up and down between 2013 and the present day. Figure 1 illustrates
how the market price of a Bitcoin has sharply risen from around five dollars in 2011 to an all-
time high of $19,783 by the end of 2017. However, due to the scale of this graph, it fails to
accurately depict  how Bitcoin’s  value has varied on a day-to-day basis.  To better illustrate
Bitcoin’s volatility, it is useful to represent this data in two additional close-up graphs. Figure 2
is limited to the pre-2017 period, while Figure 3 focuses on the period between January 2017
and the present day.
Financial economists have studied Bitcoin’s volatility in depth. Dwyer (2015) finds that Bitcoin's
average volatility is always higher than for gold or a set of foreign currencies. Cheah and Fry
(2015) and Cheung, Roca, and Su (2015) show, using econometric models, that the price of
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Bitcoin exhibits speculative bubbles. These studies show how, for many users, Bitcoin is mainly
used as a speculative asset, which people buy and sell for the sake of rapid financial profit,
explaining why, as a consequence, its value has varied sharply throughout time. This has led
some to conclude that Bitcoin is a financial asset rather than a currency (Glaser et al., 2014;
Urquhart, 2016; Yermack, 2013).
Why does volatility matter? First, a volatile asset is a less secure asset, from an investor’s point
of view. Contrary to gold or government bonds, it might yield a greater return, but bears the risk
of abruptly losing its value. Second, volatility means that one cannot predict the future value of a
commodity (labeled in Bitcoin), which tends to fluctuate constantly and in a random way. This
means that Bitcoin cannot be a stable unit of account as it is unable to represent adequately the
value of goods and services. Volatility exacerbates uncertainty and undermines the possibility of
contracting in Bitcoin, which cannot, therefore, constitute a reliable means of exchange and a
secure store of value.
In sum, the empirical evidence from Bitcoin’s financial records appears to contradict the claim
that  Bitcoin  can  provide  a  stable  means  of  payment  and  store  of  value,  in  line  with  the
theoretical prescriptions of Friedman and Hayek.
Figure 1: Bitcoin’s market price 2009–2018 (source: Own elaboration based on data collected on
blockchain.info)
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Figure 2: Bitcoin’s market price 2013–2016 (source: Own elaboration based on data collected on
blockchain.info)
Figure 3: Bitcoin’s market price 2017–present (source: Own elaboration based on data collected on
blockchain.info)
3.2 IS BITCOIN A SECURE AND EFFICIENT PAYMENT SYSTEM?
A second argument in favour of Bitcoin adoption contends that it is a more secure and efficient
means of payment and store of value than conventional money, as its payment system does not
rest on centralised institutions, such as Banks.
However, while Bitcoin’s protocol itself has been remarkably secured against possible abuses or
manipulations, this security is undercut by the difficulty for users of securing their Bitcoins
against fraud or loss. Indeed, Bitcoin users are faced with a dilemma between ensuring their
own security, and trusting intermediary services. Storing one’s wallet on one’s computer is not
much different than keeping one’s money in a safe: unsecure password can be cracked, stolen
through “phishing”  scams,  or  simply  forgotten.  And because  Bitcoin transactions  are  non-
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reversible, victims are left without recourse in case of theft (Guadamuz and Marsden, 2015, p.
10).
Therefore, for many users online wallet services and even Bitcoin exchanges can appear as safer
alternatives for storing and trading one’s Bitcoins,  just  as Banks are considered safer than
keeping one’s money in safes. However, if one resorts to such online intermediaries, Bitcoin is
not  any more secure than conventional  currencies,  where one has to rely  on banking and
payment intermediaries. It can even be even less secure, as few of these services are (for the
moment) regulated beyond the usual protection of general contract and insolvency law (the
main focus of legislators having been the use of cryptocurrencies for money laundering 5). Users
of cryptocurrencies are therefore left without much protection against fraud or bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy of MtGox, one of the prominent Bitcoin exchange platforms (where Bitcoins can be
traded-in for national currencies), has shed light on the risks taken by Bitcoin holders (Popper
and Abrams, 2014). The collapse of MtGox was partly due to technological incidents, and to an
apparent theft of no less than 744,000 Bitcoins, valued approximately at $350 million at the
time (Popper and Abrams, 2014). This illustrates how Bitcoin’s users are highly vulnerable to
frauds or to bankruptcies affecting exchange platforms. As the European Banking Authority
rightly highlights, “no specific regulatory protections exist that would cover you for losses if a
platform that exchanges or holds your virtual currencies fails or goes out of business” (European
Banking Authority, 2013, p. 1). On the contrary, centralised payment systems, such as the Euro
system, are partly protected from such events. In Belgium, for instance, banking deposits are
guaranteed by the State up to €100,000 per person. 6  Of course, the protection of deposits
differs from the protection of payments. However, the fact that deposits are protected is an
indirect protection of payments: people are ensured that their money is safe (or a large part of
it) and the continuity of payments is therefore guaranteed. Moreover, states usually play the role
of lender of last resort. If banks go bankrupt, that is, if they cannot honour their debts any more,
States  can usually  bail  them out  to  avoid  a  collapse  of  the  economy.  These  two kinds  of
protection are absent from the Bitcoin's payment system, which exposes users to frauds and to
bankruptcies of exchange platforms.
Another difficulty for Bitcoin to act as an efficient means of payment is the issue of transaction
costs. While Bitcoin speed and low transaction fees were advocated among the cryptocurrency’s
assets compared to traditional banking solutions, Bitcoin’s scaling problem due to rising user
adoption (which we will cover more extensively in the next section) has radically changed the
equation.
Indeed, the congestion in the Bitcoin network led to a sharp rise in transaction fees. While for
most of the cryptocurrency’s history users have enjoyed negligible transaction fees, the average
transaction fee had risen from less than $0.1 in January 2017 to about $4 in June 2017, even
(briefly)  reaching an all-time high of  almost $54 per transaction in mid-December 2017.  7
Confirmation time for transaction had also witnessed a sharp rise:  from an average of  20
minutes in August 2016, with a peak at 92 minutes on 16 August, it increased to an average of
123 minutes in August 2017, with a peak at 1,524 minutes on August 27 8. Since then, however,
the average fee has decreased significantly to less than $1, and the average confirmation time is
back to around 20 minutes, as of June 2018.
This return to normal has been attributed to various factors, such as a calming down of Bitcoin’s
latest speculative bubble of late 2017 (Torpey, 2018) and the adoption of a protocol upgrade
called “Segwit” intended to mitigate the issue of block size (Sedgwick, 2018) by packing more
payments  into  less  space  on  the  blockchain  (Lee,  2018).  However,  this  respite  might  be
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temporary. A future rise in the demand for Bitcoin, and a failure to timely adapt the Bitcoin
protocol to this rise, may well lead to higher and more volatile transaction fees. This equation is
further complicated by the algorithmic decrease of miners’ reward, which is supposed to be
offset by an increase in transaction fees (Nakamoto, 2018, p. 4).
To sum up, as of  today Bitcoin is  still  far from providing a secure and efficient means of
payment.  Admittedly,  many  actors  are  trying  to  address  these  issues  in  their  attempts  of
reforming Bitcoin, which is at the heart of the still-ongoing block size debate. Bitcoin users are
notably pinning their hopes on a proposed alternative payment network, called the Lightning
network, which it is still under development. However, as we will see in the next section (3.3),
there are good reasons to entertain serious doubts on the capacity of the Bitcoin community to
successfully tackle such technical challenges.
3.3 CAN BITCOIN AVOID FORMAL GOVERNANCE?
As we have seen, for some, one of the main appeals of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies lies in
their decentralised nature, which minimises the influence of coercive institutions (such as States
and Central  Banks) on monetary policy.  Whatever the merits  of  the underlying libertarian
argument, it is dubious that Bitcoin can dispense altogether with any formal governance or trust
in some privileged actors.
Let us begin by noting that the original Bitcoin source code, originally drafted under the name of
Satoshi Nakamoto, already contains a great number of substantial rules, which have an effect on
the economics of Bitcoin: the decreasing supply of Bitcoins to be minted, the cap on the size of
transaction blocks, etc.
Are these rules entirely set in stone, immutable? And if not, who has the power to alter them?
This  is  the  issue  at  the  heart  of  Bitcoin  governance.  While  Bitcoin  has  indeed no  formal
governance  (there  is  no  constitution  or  founding  principles  setting  decision-making
procedures), a set of practices have emerged, in the interplay of three categories of actors: core
developers, miners, and users.
Taking over from Nakamoto’s initial drafting of the protocol, the core development team enjoys
a sort of moral authority over the community, which entrusts it for technical decisions. Core
developers  control  the  GitHub  repository  (https://github.com/bitcoin/)  and  the  domain
(https://bitcoincore.org). As with many open source development projects, Bitcoin follows a
“autocratic-mechanistic” model, where anyone is free to contribute code, but a small group of
co-opted developers (the core developers) can ultimately decide which changes get implemented
in the software (de Laat, 2007; de Filippi and Loveluck, 2016).
However, it is important to note that the Bitcoin core development team cannot impose any
modifications to the existing Bitcoin protocol  without the consent of  at  least  a  substantial
number of miners or users. Since Bitcoin is an open source software, any user could refuse to
update its software and continue to use its older version, or propose an alternative change to
shift the software development in a different direction, thereby creating a “fork” (an alternative
branch of a software development). In the case of Bitcoin, this can happen essentially through
two mechanisms.
The first is called a “soft fork”, and consists in adding stricter rules determining which blocks or
transactions are valid. A soft fork can be imposed on the existing network with the collaboration
of miners with a mere majority of hash-power, which can enforce the new rules by rejecting
blocks or transactions that do not conform to the change.
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The second is called a “hard fork”, which touches on the fundamental characteristics of the
protocol such as block structure or difficulty rules. As it is not backward-compatible, a hard fork
requires all full nodes to upgrade, or the blockchain could split between users using the new
updated version and those using the older version.
Finally, in the Bitcoin development community, a standard form of building consensus around a
proposed modification has emerged in the form of documents called Bitcoin Implementation
Proposals (BIPs).
For a long time, these issues of governance where mostly ignored, primarily due to the idea that
the developers’  role was purely technical  and unlikely to cause deep ideological  divergence
(Lehdonvirta, 2016).
In the last  few years  however,  the Bitcoin block size  controversy has brought  to  light  the
importance of governance and what de Filippi and Loveluck (2016) call the “invisible politics” of
Bitcoin. Indeed, a deep disagreement divides the Bitcoin community on the issue of the Bitcoin’s
block size cap, a computational bottleneck that has increasingly worsened transaction fees and
processing delays with Bitcoin’s gain in popularity. A first risk of split occurred in 2015 when
some Bitcoin core developers proposed a fork called “Bitcoin XT”, aiming to increase its block
size from 1 to 8 megabytes.  After much debate, the Bitcoin community stayed loyal to the
original Bitcoin protocol (billed “Bitcoin Core”), thus avoiding a definite split. However, the
attempts by the reformists were pursued, and during 2016 and 2017 various fork proposals have
been made,  either  by consortiums of  miners  or  users.  To succeed,  these reform proposals
generally require reaching a particular adoption rate of a qualified majority of miners or users
before a given date. While the process is still ongoing, and since only a particular proposal
(Segwit) did get adopted, this process remains complex and risky for the integrity of Bitcoin’s
blockchain. And indeed, it  has already generated its first major split: in August 2017, after
months of Bitcoin scaling controversy, a group of users successfully hard-forked Bitcoin, as well
as its whole transaction history, into a new cryptocurrency with a block size of 8Mb, named
Bitcoin Cash. While the hard fork did not cause the rate of Bitcoin to crash, as some feared, it
nonetheless showed that the risk of a Bitcoin schism was a very real possibility.
The risk of  schisms can already prove problematic in the context of  free and open source
software, where forks pose the risk of scattering developers and users between incompatible
projects, threatening their sustainability (Robles and González-Barahona, 2012). However, it is
even more problematic in the case of a currency, where network effects are crucial (Lehdonvirta,
2016): while a given piece of software can be useful to a very small niche of users, a currency can
only function as such if enough people are willing to exchange it or accept it as a means of
payment. These schisms could significantly weaken Bitcoin by diminishing its attractiveness as a
medium of exchange. Admittedly, until  now, the existence of a great number of alternative
cryptocurrencies has apparently not curbed user enthusiasm for Bitcoin. However, there is a
significant  risk  that  the  ongoing  multiplication  of  Bitcoin  clones  (such  as  "Bitcoin  Cash",
"Bitcoin Gold", "Bitcoin Diamond"…) will constitute a factor of confusion for the broader public,
thereby threatening its ability to be used as a mainstream medium of exchange.
Therefore, not only is Bitcoin not the self-governing, radically decentralised currency that some
of its supporters would want it to be; Bitcoin’s informal governance, plagued by the risk of
schisms, also constitutes a significant threat to its sustainability as a currency.
A second significant  challenge to  the  idea that  cryptocurrencies  can escape governance or
central authorities is related to the particular way transaction security is achieved with Bitcoin.
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Bitcoin’s  “proof-of-work” security  is  crucially  based on trusting a  majority  of  nodes in the
system: in his 2008 paper, Nakamoto notes that proof-of-work security will be able to resist
attackers “as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating
group of attacker nodes” (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 1). Perhaps initially this threshold of 50% seemed
high enough, ensuring that it cannot easily be reached. However, in 2014, a consortium (or
“pool”) of miners called GHash.io was able to concentrate 51% of the total computational power
(Goodin, 2014). Therefore, this pool of miners potentially had the ability to circumvent the
security  of  Bitcoin’s  payment system, and spend the same coins twice or  reject  competing
miners' transactions. That this concentration of power did not last long is due to the care of
individual miners, who decided to pull from the pool out of a concern for Bitcoin’s integrity. Due
to the criticism, the operators  of  GHash.io  issued a  statement and committed to  “take all
necessary precautions to prevent reaching 51% of all hashing power”(Hajdarbegovic, 2014).
Therefore, as others have noted, Bitcoin’s central security feature “depends on the goodwill of a
few people whose names nobody knows” (Bershidsky, 2014). Can the Bitcoin community rely on
the goodwill of individual miners and social responsibility of mining pools to avert an attack? Or
should mining pools be prevented to acquire such a position? The latter option would likely
involve  some kind of  antitrust  regulation,  similar  to  conventional  antitrust  laws.  It  would
require, therefore, a sort of central competition authority to prevent collusion among miners.
Consequently, either the Bitcoin community retains its own libertarian form of “governance” by
competition  between  forks,  with  risks  for  its  governability,  user  base  and  security,  or  it
recognises  that  some  degree  of  formal  central  governance  is  inevitable.  However,  that
recognition leads to what Lehdonvirta bills as the “blockchain’s governance paradox”: if Bitcoin
users address the problem of governance by trusting a central institution to make the rules, then
why do they need a decentralised cryptocurrency anymore? (Lehdonvirta, 2016).
In summary, the prevailing skepticism against governance among the Bitcoin community has
made any change in its algorithmic regulation very difficult and long to achieve, and prevents
putting in place any structural protection against a collusion by miners to breach its proof-of-
work security. Bitcoin’s informal governance model does not fare well compared to its promise
to provide a reliable alternative to the allegedly flawed centralised banking system.
3.4 DOES BITCOIN IMPROVE PAYMENT PRIVACY?
Finally,  one  last  perceived advantage  of  Bitcoin  over  conventional  currencies  is  the  better
protection of payment privacy that it is supposed to provide, since its decentralised payment
system makes it independent of banks or other payment intermediaries, and does not require
disclosure  of  an  account  holder’s  identity.  Admittedly,  this  is  not  a  claim  that  more
knowledgeable Bitcoin proponents are likely to make, as it has been at the centre of much
criticism. However, it remains a recurrent preconception, at least in popular opinion and among
some Bitcoin users, and therefore deserves a brief discussion here.
There are many good reasons why people might seek privacy in their transactions. They might
wish to avoid mass data collection of their transaction history by private companies for targeted
marketing, or they can be political opponents, fearing retribution from authoritarian regimes.
However, these privacy-protecting features are also what makes Bitcoin a particularly suitable
tool for engaging in fraud, illegal business, and tax evasion, which has been a recurrent concern
for lawmakers (Gibbs, 2018; Gruber, 2013; Kollewe, 2018; Marian, 2013; Mersch, 2018).
At the core of the Bitcoin protocol are two distinct features, which have opposite tendencies in
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terms of anonymity. On the one hand, Bitcoin’s public ledger tends to make it more transparent,
as all transactions are logged in a publicly accessible ledger. On the other hand, Bitcoin’s peer-
to-peer network tends to make it  more anonymous (as it  does not rely on the presence of
financial intermediaries holding all the users’ information).
As others have noted, Bitcoin only provides pseudo-anonymity, in that while a given transaction
only  lists  the pseudo-anonymous Bitcoin address  of  the sender  and receiver,  details  of  all
transactions are logged on the public ledger. Therefore, as Luu and Inwinkelried (2015, p. 10)
put it, “[i]f a Bitcoin address could somehow be associated with a specific identity, the pseudo-
anonymity would be penetrated”. Parties to a transaction could be traced back to the holder of
an exchange account, by using identification techniques such as traffic analysis, and transaction
graph analysis (Biryukov, Khovratovich, and Pustogarov, 2014; Luu and Imwinkelried, 2015, p.
24; Reid and Harrigan, 2013, p. 17). State authorities could use such information to identify
customers  of  cryptocurrency  exchanges,  provided  such  services  are  imposed  “Know  Your
Customer” obligations under anti-money laundering regulations, as is the case in the US under
the US Department of Treasury’s guidance on virtual currencies 9, as well as in the EU with the
recent  adoption  of  the  5th  Anti-Money  Laundering  Directive  10.  In  the  EU,  since  “virtual
currency” exchanges services as well as custodian wallet providers are now covered by the 5th
AML directive, they are subject to customers due diligence obligations as well as obligations to
report transactions suspected of being the proceeds of criminal activity, or being related to
money laundering or terrorist financing.
Therefore,  until  Bitcoin  use  become  sufficiently  widespread  that  an  autonomous  Bitcoin
economy could be imaginable,  the position of gatekeeper held by exchanges in the flow of
Bitcoin  appear  to  undercut  the  claim  for  Bitcoin  to  be  any  more  privacy-protecting  than
conventional  currency.  Indeed,  none  is  entirely  disintermediated,  they  are  just  relying  on
different sorts of financial intermediaries.
A possible way to disrupt this possibility of identification would be to use mixing services (also
called “laundry services”), which allow a user to exchange a given amount of tainted Bitcoins for
a corresponding sum coming from a multiplicity of other users,  and sent to a new Bitcoin
address (Gruber, 2013, pp.189–193; Marian, 2013, p. 44). However, the issue with relying on
third-party mixing services is that they could themselves be the target of court injunctions, or be
the subject of "Know Your Customer" obligations, as with Bitcoin exchanges.
Of course, users could possibly resort to exchanges or mixing services based in lax or lawless
jurisdiction, in order to minimise the risk that their data be handed over to the authorities by
such services. They would however face an important issue of trust, as those unregulated mixing
services are also likely to be the less reliable, with little guarantee of seeing one's money back in
case  of  fraud.  This  apparently  happened to  Meiklejohn et  al.  (2013)  while  studying  these
services, who note in their article that “[o]ne of these [mixing services], BitMix, simply stole our
money”.
Thus, it does not seem that Bitcoin could achieve a better level of transaction privacy than
conventional currencies. Some even go so far as arguing that, far from making the job of law
enforcement agencies harder, Bitcoin even generates new opportunities to track down illicit
activities (Kaplanov, 2012, p. 171). Companies like Chainanalysis have developed software aimed
at analysing the blockchain to identify Bitcoin users, which have been used by several public
agencies, such as the US Internal Revenue Service, the FBI, or Europol (Orcutt, 2017).
This provides a good reason for State authorities not to ban Bitcoin altogether,  for risk of
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promoting alternative cryptocurrencies that better protect transaction privacy without resorting
to third parties. However, a case could be made that cryptocurrencies embedding protocol-level
privacy protection (such as the proposed Zerocash, which would integrate a mixing service in
the blockchain itself 11) should be banned, as they could be used as gateway currencies for
transacting in Bitcoin, therefore evading scrutiny by State authorities. Whether such repressive
approach is at all feasible remains an open question.
More  fundamentally,  the  decentralised  (although  not  entirely  disintermediated)  nature  of
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin has another important drawback for user privacy: without a bank
or financial institution, users are solely responsible for the privacy of their transaction. And the
average — not particularly tech savvy — consumer will be more likely to commit some privacy
oversight  in  its  Bitcoin  transactions.  Therefore,  paradoxically,  the  many  flaws  in  Bitcoin’s
privacy protection mean that unsophisticated users might enjoy a lesser level of transaction
privacy  by  using  such  a  pseudo-anonymous  cryptocurrency  than  by  relying  on  traditional
financial intermediaries.
CONCLUSION
Now that the latest Bitcoin "gold rush" appears to have – momentarily – receded, the central
question for potential Bitcoin users remains: are there good reasons to adopt Bitcoin, other than
investing in a speculative asset?
This article highlighted four arguments justifying the attractiveness of Bitcoin. To recall, the first
lies in Bitcoin’s practical promise of constituting a stable currency, immune to inflation, in the
spirit of what neoliberal authors like Hayek or Friedman have argued for. The second is that
Bitcoin could help reducing state coercion by dispensing with the need of a monetary policy, in
line with the libertarian ideal of a minimal state. The third argument is that Bitcoin would
constitute  a  more  efficient  and  safe  system  of  payment.  And  the  fourth  is  that  Bitcoin
supposedly better protects transaction privacy than the conventional banking system.
As we saw, it is dubious that Bitcoin, as it is now, can deliver on these promises.
First, Bitcoin’s financial record detracts from any claim of being a stable currency: its highly
volatile value makes it risky for merchants to accept, and inconvenient for consumers to use.
This, alone, makes Bitcoin unfit to be used as an alternative currency for the time being.
Second, Bitcoin’s promise to provide an efficient store of value or means of payment is not
supported by evidence from its use. On the one hand, securely storing and trading one’s Bitcoins
requires  a  substantial  level  of  knowledge  from  its  users.  On  the  other  hand,  consumer
confidence in Bitcoin’s capacity to provide efficient payment facilities lies on shaky foundations:
an increased success of Bitcoin could lead to higher transaction fees and longer confirmation
times, which would make it impractical for consumers.
Third, the promise of making Bitcoin a currency independent from central authorities has been
largely a double-edged sword. Even if the Bitcoin protocol is an achievement of a currency run
by a  radically  decentralised network,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  it  can act  as  a  reliable  and
governable currency without some formal governance mechanisms, and without resorting to
some  financial  intermediaries.  As  exemplified  by  the  ongoing  scaling  debate,  the  Bitcoin
community’s unwillingness to seriously address the issue of Bitcoin governance undermines its
resilience  to  economic  and  technical  challenges.  Bitcoin’s  current  informal  governance
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mechanism generates recurrent risks for its sustainability and integrity, as it creates uncertainty
for users as to the value of their holdings as well as to which “fork” of the Bitcoin blockchain
constitutes  the  “real”  Bitcoin.  Moreover,  without  formal  governance  mechanisms,  Bitcoin
ultimately relies on trusting the goodwill of its users (the very thing it purported to avoid) to
avert a potential miner collusion to form a 51% attack. The emergence of a multitude of new
intermediaries  seems  to  indicate  that  even  with  cryptocurrencies,  banking  and  financial
intermediaries may still have some usefulness as a layer of protection for consumers after all.
Fourth,  we pointed out  that  Bitcoin’s  pseudo-anonymous payment system provided a  very
limited layer of protection for the privacy of user transactions. As with security, Bitcoin puts
most of the burden of privacy protection on its users’ shoulders, which creates a disparity in user
privacy  along  the  same  lines  as  the  digital  divide  in  technology  knowledge.  Therefore,
paradoxically, for the average user, Bitcoin might provide a lesser level of transaction privacy
than traditional  financial  intermediaries.  And even if  Bitcoin  did  provide  a  better  level  of
transaction privacy than conventional currencies, it would generate a range of further questions
as to the possibility of law enforcement against crime and tax evasion.
Therefore, contrary to what its proponents might hope for,  Bitcoin is far from fulfilling its
promises to be a stable, efficient, radically decentralised and privacy-protecting currency. The
reason  for  its  relative  popularity  and  substantial  valuation  lies  thus  either  in  unrealistic
expectations from its users as to its capacity to act as a functioning currency, or in the prospects
of rewards allowed by its status of high-risk speculative asset.
This, in turn, does not mean that cryptocurrencies are a useless development altogether. Their
advent has brought about a great number of worthy innovations, with many useful applications.
In particular, Bitcoin’s distributed ledger technology might find useful applications in many
areas.  Some  have  hailed  blockchain’s  potential  in  fostering  decentralised  organisation,  by
reducing the transaction costs of organising cooperation among a great number of individuals
(de Filippi and Wright, 2018, p. 136). Even central and private banks have started looking into
using blockchain technology, not so much for introducing cryptocurrencies (although such plans
do  exist  12)  but  mainly  to  improve  on  their  infrastructure  for  areas  such  as  clearing  and
settlement or trade finance (Arnold, 2017). While these projects are clearly inspired by the
technological innovations behind Bitcoin, they are likely to significantly diverge from Bitcoin’s
main ideological  commitments  (Bordo and Levin,  2017).  Blockchain  technology  could  also
possibly be used in countries where banks cannot be trusted, or where the monetary system is
failing, as some have argued (Varoufakis, 2014). In general, blockchain could be used to reduce
costs  (although  on  the  condition  of  adopting  alternative  mechanisms  to  reduce  its
environmental  impact)  13  and make payment settlements  easier.  However,  with blockchain
applications such as Bitcoin, it is important to take such claims with a grain of salt, and go
beyond the overly enthusiastic rhetoric to assess the actual merits of the technology.
If its proponents want Bitcoin to become more than a speculative asset, they will probably have
to adopt a more explicit and formalised governance to be able to seriously tackle not only mere
technical  challenges,  but  also  the  underlying  political  choices  behind  them  as  to  the
cryptocurrency’s future. The question remains however, whether Bitcoin can be reformed so as
to  become  a  workable  currency,  while  still  retaining  some  of  the  attractiveness  that  its
enthusiast saw in its initial promises. As of today, Bitcoin seems far from being the future of
money.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See www.mapofcoins.com for a comprehensive list of existing cryptocurrencies and their
underlying technologies.
2. While we will focus on Bitcoin, our discussion could also apply to other cryptocurrencies
insofar as they share some of Bitcoin’s characteristics and aims.
3. See Aglietta and Orléan (2002, 84–85), Tobin (2008, 1) and Graeber (2011, 46–47).
4. For a detailed presentation of how transactions in Bitcoins works, see Ali et al. (2014a, p.
7–8). For an overview of bitcoin, see Böhme et al. (2015).
5. In that regard, let us note the inclusion of virtual currency exchanges and “custodian wallet
services” among the services regulated by the recently adopted 5th Anti-Money Laundering
Directive, Directive 2018/843. In the US, although no new legislation was adopted on the
matter, these services are effectively considered as covered under the Bank Secrecy Act
according FinCEN’s guidance on virtual currencies, US Department of Treasury, 18 March 2013.
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Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 22 October 2018 | Volume 7 | Issue 4
6. As described on the website of the Belgian Ministry of Finance:
http://fondsdegarantie.belgium.be/fr
7. These statistics are based on our own computations, thanks to data collected on
blockchain.com. See also Lee (2018).
8. According to statistics from blockchain.com.
9. US Department of Treasury, Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Persons Administering,
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, 18 March 2013.
10. Directive 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU)
2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money
laundering or terrorist financing, art. 1.
11. See Miers et al (2013)
12. UBS and a consortium of financial institutions are reportedly developing a central bank
backed cryptocurrency called Utility Settlement Coin, on which few details are known
(Kaminska 2017)
13. Indeed, although Bitcoin’s proof-of-work security algorithm has been rightly criticized for its
high environmental impact (see Deetman, 2016), alternative security algorithm that are less
energy intensive have been proposed (such as “proof-of-stake” algorithm, which would rely less
on solving difficult computational problems, by replacing “computational power” with “financial
stake” as a consensus mechanism)
